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Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
Telephone Rates
(continued from page 145)

jected directory assistance usage
data or its corresponding revenue
and expense projections. Because
these omissions precluded independent verification of the reliability of United's figures, the district
court found that OCA's concerns
regarding inflated numbers and
duplicate recovery were validated.
Finally, because the Utilities
Board had failed to furnish OCA
with the calculations that led it to
conclude that the increases were
just and reasonable, its conclusion
was open to dispute.
On appeal to the supreme court,
United argued that the district
court's findings were merely a reiteration OCA's contentions. United
claimed that unless OCA presented
its own contrary data refuting
United's calculations, OCA had
not disputed material facts making
an evidentiary hearing worthwhile. Although the supreme court
agreed that purely legal disputes
did not warrant an evidentiary
hearing, the court dismissed United's argument.
The supreme court agreed with
the lower court's findings that
OCA has raised sufficient factual
issues warranting an evidentiary
hearing. The court found that the
Utilities Board had mistakenly decided that no genuine dispute regarding material facts existed when
it relied solely on United's version
of the facts and prevented OCA's
challenge. Because OCA represented United's consumers in this
case, the court held that constitutional considerations necessitated
that OCA be given the opportunity
to examine and to test the credibility of the data upon which the
Utilities Board based it decision.
The supreme court therefore affirmed the district court's remand
to the agency for further proceedings.
Aida M. Alaka
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Insurance Agent May
Have Bound Company
To Temporary
Insurance Policy
Despite
Misrepresentation By
Insured
In Ellingwood v. N.N. Investors
Life Insurance Co., Inc., 805 P.2d

70 (N.M. 1991), the Supreme
Court of New Mexico held that
genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to the authority
of an insurance agent to bind the
company to an oral contract for
temporary insurance coverage and
with respect to alleged misrepresentations made on an application
for insurance coverage.
Background
On October 30, 1985, James
Streeter ("Streeter") applied for
health and life insurance from
N.N. Investors Life Insurance Co.
("N.N. Investors"). Streeter suffered from scoliosis, a spinal deformity, which was plainly visible.
The agent for N.N. Investors asked
Streeter questions and completed
the application forms based on
Streeter's verbal responses. The
agent asked whether Streeter ever
had any indication, diagnosis or
treatment of various respiratory
diseases or muscle and bone disorders, to which Streeter replied,
"No." The agent indicated on the
form that Streeter's lower spine
had been surgically fused and recorded the name, address, and
phone number of Streeter's treating physician. Streeter did not
have a physical examination or
interview with a physician prior to
completing the insurance application of N.N. Investors.
The language of the application
provided that coverage would not
be effective until the insurance
company approved the application
and the applicant paid the first
premium. Streeter signed the application and asked the agent when
coverage would be effective. According to the affidavit of Streeter's grandmother, the agent responded, in her presence, that
coverage would begin upon receipt
of payment of the first premium;

when Streeter paid the agent, the
agent replied that coverage was in
effect at that time. Relying solely
on the application, the company
subsequently approved major
medical and term life insurance
coverage for Streeter. The insurance certificate stated that coverage would begin at 12:00 noon on
November 12, 1985.
On November 10, 1985, Streeter
entered a hospital emergency room
for treatment of severe bronchial
pneumonia. Streeter died 3:40
a.m. on November 12, just over
eight hours prior to the time of
effectiveness of coverage, as stated
on the insurance certificate.
Claims and Defenses
Upon receipt of claims under
the insurance policies, N.N. Investors investigated Streeter's medical
history and discovered that he suffered from scoliosis and had suffered pulmonary problems in the
past. N.N. Investors claimed that
Streeter's failure to disclose these
medical conditions amounted to
material misrepresentations. As a
result, N.N. Investors refused to
pay benefits under the policies and
refunded the premiums paid by
Streeter to date. In addition to the
claim of misrepresentation, N.N.
Investors argued that under the
terms of the application, insurance
coverage was not effective until
approved by the company. N.N.
Investors argued that the terms of
the agreement excluded coverage
for pre-existing conditions; since
the pneumonia occurred prior to
the effective date of coverage, it
constituted such a pre-existing
condition.
In response, Patricia Ellingwood
("Ellingwood"), as representative
of Streeter's estate, sued N.N. Investors for breach of contract and
negligence. Ellingwood claimed
that N.N. Investors's agent had
apparent authority to bind the insurance company by oral agreement to temporary insurance coverage effective upon receipt of
payment. Ellingwood further
claimed that N.N. Investors violated a statute regulating temporary
insurance coverage which she
claimed constituted negligence per
se on the part of N.N. Investors
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and its agent. N.M. Stat. Ann. 1978
§ 59A-18-22 (1988).
The District Court
The District Court, Curry County, granted summary judgment for
N.N. Investors. The court noted
that N.N. Investors had a right of
rescission because Streeter made
material misrepresentations of fact
on his application. The court also
concluded that the application unambiguously stated that coverage
was not effective until it was approved by the company. Ellingwood appealed the summary judgment order.
The Supreme Court
of New Mexico
Upon review, the Supreme
Court of New Mexico reversed the
district court's grant of summary
judgment. The court held that an
agent could orally bind an insurer
to coverage effective immediately
if such an act were within the
agent's apparent authority. The
court held that issues of fact existed as to whether N.N. Investors's
agent had apparent authority to
bind the company to a contract for
temporary insurance and whether
Streeter made material misrepresentations on the insurance application.
Apparent Authority
The Supreme Court of New
Mexico first addressed the threshold matter of when Streeter's insurance coverage became effective.
Ellingwood argued that N.N. Investors insured Streeter prior to
noon on November 12 through
temporary insurance coverage issued by N.N. Investors's agent.
Ellingwood alleged N.N. Investors's agent had apparent authority
to bind the company to temporary
coverage effective immediately.
The court defined apparent authority as the authority that a
reasonable person would believe
an agent had, in light of the insurer's holding the agent out as an
authorized representative of the
company. The court noted that,
under common law rules, an insurance agent, if authorized, could
create a valid oral contract for
insurance coverage during the period prior to the issuance or delivery
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of the policy by the company. The
court held it was a question of fact
whether N.N. Investors's agent had
apparent authority to bind the
company with respect to temporary insurance coverage.
The court reasoned that while
the terms of the agreement specifically stated that coverage was not
effective until approved by the
company, it was the duty of the
insured to examine the documents
only to the extent it was reasonable
under the circumstances. The
court stated that an insured could
be expected to rely on the agent to
explain the complex terms of an
insurance application. Therefore,
there existed an issue in this case as
to whether it was reasonable for
Streeter to rely on the agent's statement that coverage was effective
upon receipt of payment.
In further support of its holding,
the court referred to affidavits of
former customers of the agent submitted by Ellingwood which
showed that despite contrary language in the application, it was the
agent's usual procedure to represent immediate coverage with payment of the first premium. The
court stated that from these affidavits of former customers, a juror
could infer that it was the company's practice to allow the agent to
collect the initial premium at the
time of completion of the application for insurance. The court reasoned that an agent authorized to
receive payments would have apparent authority to bind the company immediately. The court stated that a typical customer could
reasonably believe that he had purchased some immediate benefit
through payment of a cash premium to an insurance company's
agent. This belief would only be
reinforced by an agent's oral assurance that this was the case. Therefore, the court held this evidence
also created a jury question regarding the apparent authority of N.N.
Investors's agent.
Misrepresentation
The Supreme Court of New
Mexico next addressed the issue of
whether a jury question existed
with respect to the alleged misrepresentations made on Streeter's insurance application. The court

held that a jury, relying on the
evidence in the case, could make
inferences different from those alleged with respect to Streeter's representations of his medical condition.
First, the court stated that the
answers recorded by the agent on
the application were internally inconsistent. Even though the agent
recorded negative responses to the
questions regarding various respiratory diseases and muscle and
bone disorders, he nevertheless recorded explanations regarding
Streeter's lower spine surgery and
information about the treating
physician when such explanations
were required only for affirmative
responses. Additionally, Streeter's
spinal condition was readily apparent from his physical appearance;
he wore a back brace and had a
very short torso and neck. The
court held that the agent's reluctance to ask about Streeter's deformity should not work to disadvantage Streeter. Similarly, the court
refused to penalize Streeter's estate
for the insurer's failure to investigate information alerting it to a
serious medical condition prior to
the filing of a claim. The court held
that it was a question for the jury to
decide whether the information
provided to the agent was sufficient to alert N.N. Investors to
Streeter's serious spinal condition.
The court also held that Ellingwood had introduced sufficient evidence regarding Streeter's pulmonary condition to preclude
summary judgment.
The Supreme Court of New
Mexico held that issues of fact
existed as to whether N.N. Investors's agent had apparent authority
to bind the company to a contract
for temporary insurance and as to
whether Streeter made material
misrepresentations on the insurance application. The court therefore reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in
favor of N.N. Investors and remanded the case for trial. The
court noted that the negligence
claims relating to N.N. Investors's
agent remained before the court on
remand.
Astrid E. Ellis

